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THE THEORY OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Stephen Welch

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STEPHEN WELCH

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UNIVERSITY PRESS

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To Archie Brown

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Preface

In the Introduction to follow, I will offer the intellectual justification that a book with the title *The Theory of Political Culture* plainly needs. Here I will briefly offer justification of a more personal sort. I have been interested in political culture since I wrote an undergraduate essay on the subject in 1982. My tutor then, Archie Brown, suggested it as a doctoral dissertation topic under his supervision, and as it seemed to offer scope for both political and philosophical analysis (or to avoid the need to choose between them), I welcomed his suggestion. I wish I could say that I have never looked back. In fact I have often looked back, both during my doctoral research and in the years that followed. The intuitive plausibility of the idea of political culture has a darker side in the formidable difficulty of saying anything at all rigorous about it, and while, as they say, everything is connected to everything else, somehow political culture seems *more* connected to everything else. But despite numerous frustrations (maybe because of them), not to mention some explicit advice, I have kept returning to it. It is to acknowledge the fatefulness, for me, of Archie's initial suggestion, as well as his unflagging support since then, that I dedicate this book to him.

Some explanation is in order of the lapse of time between my first book on the subject and this one. Of course, distractions abound in an academic job, and indeed the way in which research is nowadays incentivized can, ironically, itself amount to a distraction. Nevertheless I would have to accept most of the blame myself. I have often been called a perfectionist, but I see myself rather as an 'adequatist'—and it has taken a while, given the topic, to achieve that standard. To adapt a little Robert Nozick's description in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, writing a book of this kind is like stuffing a collection of unwieldy objects into a sack, squeezing them and shaving off bits in the process, quickly photographing the sack before it bursts open, and then publishing the photo. If the shape still seems inelegant, I can only apologize, and admit that several even bulkier sacks have burst open on the way to this one.

I am therefore grateful to Dominic Byatt of OUP for his encouragement and especially his forbearance. Colleagues in the Politics Department and latterly the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham have either tolerated my lengthy labours or supported them, and I am grateful for that too. In particular I thank Maria Dimova-Cookson, Pete Kneen, Andy MacMullen, Jean Richardson, Peter Stirk, Julia Stapleton, Bob Williams, and Ruth Wittlinger, all of whom have kindly read and commented on various things I have written about political culture. Gidon Cohen's understanding of what this project was

about has often seemed better than my own. Other friends—Mark Aspinwall, Patrick Bell, Erica Benner, Bill Callahan, Anna Dickson, Caroline Kennedy, Monica Serrano, and Mike Yates—have offered over the years more general encouragement and support, which I have needed more than they probably imagined. The reviewers of my original proposal to OUP offered excellent advice, though they perhaps no longer remember doing so. Copy-editor Javier Kalhat and proofreader Rebecca Bryant were very helpful indeed.

In what follows, where there is sustained discussion of a single source, I have placed page references within the text rather than in endnotes. In quotations, all emphasis is that of the original, except where otherwise indicated.

Introduction

WHY A THEORY OF POLITICAL CULTURE?

According to one political science textbook, political culture belongs to a 'rare category' of concepts 'over which social scientists are in accord', and 'despite considerable focus on it for a number of years by scholars of different persuasions, there is overall agreement on its precise meaning and, more importantly, on its complex relationship to concepts of state and society'.¹ Conversely, it has been suggested that 'many now view [political culture] as little more than a footnote in the history of political research'.² Then there is the much-quoted observation of Max Kaase that defining political culture resembles an 'attempt to nail a pudding to the wall'.³ These views suggest that a theory of political culture, the project of this book, is not needed, desired, or even possible.

A somewhat more productive observation has been made by Judith Shklar:

Political culture is a notion that serves policy-makers well even if its scientific standing is poor . . . Political culture as a concept may not explain social conduct, but it can be used by an informed political observer to devise intelligent questions about what the likely and the unlikely consequences of political actions will be.⁴

Shklar's paradox poses the challenge of understanding how a concept whose scientific standing is poor could be of any use to policy-makers, empirically-minded and practical people as we may take them to be, and how a concept that does not *explain* conduct could be of use in formulating questions that allow us to *predict* it. Furthermore, the paradox is both broader and deeper than Shklar says: broader, because it is not just policy-makers, but recurrently academic analysts too, who have found the need to have recourse either to the concept of political culture or to something very like it; deeper, because it touches on questions of what we mean by explanation, what in general we can know about the political world within the framework of a scientific outlook, and indeed what a scientific outlook is. This book represents a response to the challenge represented by Shklar's paradox and the broader and deeper issues it evokes.

The career of the concept of political culture has been uneven, with its period of most unambiguous acceptance among political scientists being in the early 1960s. Even here, though, significant differences among the founding fathers of the concept were apparent, with the more quantitative approach taken in Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* contrasting in not altogether acknowledged ways with the interpretive and historical one of Pye and Verba's

Political Culture and Political Development.⁵ Some forceful theoretical critiques appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁶ A lively area of political culture research nevertheless developed in the study of communist states,⁷ in which methods and methodology became an explicit topic of discussion.⁸ Since then, the concept has fluctuated in popularity, and despite several anathemas being pronounced against it, often from the quarter of rational choice theory,⁹ it has continued to experience periodic revivals.¹⁰ Moreover, several large research programmes have appeared which owe much to the idea of political culture without always using it explicitly. Ronald Inglehart's impressive body of research into 'postmaterialism' is only one of several empirical investigations of 'values',¹¹ while the study of social capital, influentially defined by Robert Putnam as 'connections among individuals—social networks and the *norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness* that arise from them' has also spawned, thanks to the component I have highlighted, a large literature on the measurement of 'trust'.¹² Thus the idea of political culture, if not always the concept, has remained very much at the centre of attention.¹³

This brief but intense bombardment of references is perhaps enough to give support to my contention that political culture is an inescapable concept in the study of politics, but also a deeply problematic one, or as Jeffrey Goldfarb has more pithily said, 'Political culture—can't live with it, can't live without it.'¹⁴ But I do not think the matter should be left where either Shklar or (as I will soon argue) Goldfarb leaves it. The paradox calls for a resolution, and this entails theoretical work. Of course the perception of a theoretical deficit is not entirely new, and there has been a succession of attempts to rethink, reinvent, or replace the concept of political culture, including Goldfarb's recent book and the doctoral research, subsequently a book, of the present author.¹⁵ These theoretical proposals have, however, been either very partial in their coverage of the literature or else lacking in theoretical depth, and even the one of which I most approve stopped short of a fully worked out theory.¹⁶ The difficulty, of course, is to combine breadth of coverage with depth of analysis. The present book has no better chance than any finite effort of completely avoiding the trade-offs which that combination entails. Nevertheless it has seemed to me that the alternatives either of picking one line of argument in political culture research and declaring it to be the right one, or of radically replacing the concept with something that only replicates its difficulties, should equally be avoided. Rather, the attempt to look both closely and comprehensively at the concept that we already have, useful as it evidently is, and to interrogate and if possible reconstruct its theoretical foundations, is worth making.

It is not, however, only the intellectual contention that surrounds the concept of political culture that indicates the need for theoretical work. The way the concept has actually been used also reveals a severe theoretical deficiency. It was initially introduced to express a *limit*, both causally and methodologically. In causal terms, it denoted something which gave rise to

persistence in political life and *resistance* to change. In methodological terms, the concept limited the scope of generalizations, and in particular supported a sceptical view of claims that universal laws governed political life, or that convergence towards a uniform condition was underway. But contrasting, more dynamic, uses of the concept of political culture have also been made. For instance, when students of social movements talk of ‘cultural framing’, they have in mind an active and creative undertaking by the promoters of political change which uses culture as its instrument.¹⁷ When observers talk of ‘culture wars’, as they increasingly have in relation to American politics in the last two decades, again something very dynamic and creative is intended.¹⁸ Goldfarb’s recent book, subtitled *The Power of Culture* versus *the Culture of Power*, seeks to emphasize this creative potential of political culture (the ‘power of culture’) against the more static and limiting causal potential it has in the conventional view.

However, it is not particularly novel to admit the existence of an element of fluidity in political culture. In fact no student of politics would be likely to insist on the idea that political culture never changes; that the political persistence and resistance to which it gives rise are insuperable. The explicit analysis of political-cultural change which Goldfarb advocates is not new either. An example is a group of studies produced by the ‘*Culture Matters* Research Project’,¹⁹ whose motto is a remark by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan: ‘The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself.’²⁰

The problem is not to acknowledge a role for political culture both in the inertia and the fluidity of political life, but to resolve the apparent contradiction theoretically. In the *Culture Matters* Project we instead find that the ‘conservative truth’ is substantiated by a process of elimination of explanatory alternatives that neglect culture. With this method, ‘culture’ becomes just a name for the set of remaining factors, seeming to vary by country, and assumed to function causally as a set—what Beatrice Whiting has called a ‘packaged variable’.²¹ The ‘liberal truth’ is on the other hand established by case studies of deliberate cultural change, for instance through the educational system. The problem here is to get from these case studies an understanding of why attempts at deliberate cultural change sometimes work and sometimes do not. One of the studies reports ‘the message of Alexis de Tocqueville: It is difficult (and probably impossible from the outside) to build democracy without a critical mass of democrats’.²² These and similar observations reveal a problem of explanatory circularity: that to effect cultural change it already needs to have happened. Culture therefore seems to enter in as the explanation for both the success and the failure of programmes of cultural change.

The case studies of political-cultural change offered by Goldfarb similarly fail to provide more than illustration.²³ In general, simply adding the idea of

the fluidity of political culture to the idea of its inertia only formulates an explanatory wish list: it does not in itself explain anything. The mere juxtaposition of the 'conservative' and 'liberal truths' recalls the reasoning of Goldilocks, the heroine of a Victorian fairy tale who encountered, in the home of the three bears, bowls of porridge that were too hot, too cold, and 'just right', and beds that were too hard, too soft, and 'just right'. The criterion Goldilocks used was to favour the middle position on the sole grounds of the unacceptability of the extremes. When the Goldilocks criterion occurs in political culture research, and elsewhere, it is the sign of a theoretical lacuna. Neither complete environmental determinism nor complete cultural determinism is acceptable: the 'just right' account must be one in-between. For choices of breakfast and bedding this is enough, but for a theory of political culture we need more.

My claim that the theory of political culture needs considerable improvement runs into a radical objection from the interpretive tradition in political culture research, which instead insists that the point of the idea of culture is to rule out the project of theory altogether. This position has a recent strong statement in a riposte to the *Culture Matters* Project, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz's *Culture Troubles*. These authors express their anti-theoretical position by contrasting 'political culture' with a 'cultural approach', a terminological stipulation I consider to be unduly selective,²⁴ although terminology is not our main concern. By emphasizing instead the idea of an *approach*, Chabal and Daloz seek to deny that there is a set of 'fixed "cultural" characteristics' (p. 109), that culture is a set of "givens" providing the key to existing differences' (p. 171), that it should be conceptualized as beliefs, customs, or values, still less attitudes or opinions (pp. 86–8; 148); and that it can be construed as a factor or variable (pp. 95–6) or indeed as a cause (p. 145). Yet they also say that culture is a 'system of meanings' (pp. 23, 45), an 'environment', a 'matrix' or 'blueprint' (p. 21), 'software' that provides 'codes, rules and instructions' (p. 86), and that 'cultural systems have had a *deep influence* on how we live' (p. 37). The approach seems to be unable to avoid conceiving of culture as a thing, and a thing moreover with causal implications. But it disables itself from a closer look at these relationships as general processes, in favour of an indiscriminating 'inductivism' that insists that the context will always tell us what are the appropriate concepts. While no one would object to the suggestion that 'it is not enough to declare, once and for all, that the selected conceptual framework is the most appropriate' (p. 187) and that 'theoretical preference should at all times be informed by empirical reality' (p. 192), our need to understand the relationships involved invariably falls back on some kind of theory, such as notions of the 'deep influence' of culture, and analogies to blueprints or software.²⁵ These are substitutes for causal posits which improve on those of the *Culture Matters* Project only on the measure of vagueness. The interpretivist retort represents a denial of theory, using the

term 'denial' in the sense bequeathed to us by a popularized psychoanalysis: an attempted repression of something that cannot in fact be avoided. Yet the 'return of the repressed' points us again to the necessity of theory.

If these examples are at all indicative (which I will demonstrate they are), we find a compelling case for developing a theory of political culture, in place of the explanatory wish list produced by the usual rendering of the causal dynamics of political culture and in place of the denied theory that creeps back into interpretive accounts of culture. It is a compelling case, that is, so long as we accept that political culture is worth talking about at all. As I have argued, the concept or its analogues have been recurrent in political analysis; but this fact is in itself only suggestive. Pointing out to the opponents of political culture research that their critiques have not led to the complete abandonment of political culture research is not likely to convince them that the critiques are in error. A theory of political culture must therefore deal with the supposed alternatives to political-cultural explanation. My strategy for doing so will be to argue that the recurrence of political culture is manifest not only in the stubbornness of its exponents, but within the arguments of its opponents as well. Political culture remains worthy of our theoretical attention not just because some analysts refuse to relinquish it, but because those who insist we do cannot help but rely on it too. Just as interpretivist critique of political culture theory relies on covert and thus unanalysed causal claims, so critique of political culture research as a whole cannot dispense with culture, even while it tries to dispense with the task of understanding it.

In this book, then, I try to make the case for a theory of political culture to a wide audience: to practitioners of different ways of doing political culture research, and also to those who consider the very idea of political culture, never mind its theory, to be a dead letter in political science. My claim is not just that if we, as students of politics, are to talk about political culture we must have an adequate theory: it is that we cannot escape talking about political culture, so that the current dire condition of its theory is a matter of concern for all students of politics.

WHAT IS A THEORY OF POLITICAL CULTURE?

The examples I have just looked at give us, as it were in silhouette, an indication of what we are lacking in the theory of political culture. We lack, to put it in the simplest terms, an adequate account of what political culture is and how it works. Or to put it in more elevated language, a theory of political culture should contain both an ontology of political culture and, on that basis, an explanation of its causal dynamics.

The more elevated language brings with it a certain amount of philosophical baggage, though also the possibility of greater precision. In the philosophy of the social sciences, ontology has become the special province of the 'realist' school.²⁶ As I will explain in detail in Chapter 1, the realist critique of positivism has considerable merit, particularly in its insistence that causal analysis should include a focus on processes and mechanisms.²⁷ Up to a point, the realist imperative aligns with the phenomenological one, as I understand it (see note 16): it is indeed essential to look more closely at political culture than the macro-correlations of positivist political culture research can do. But in at least some of its formulations, realism overstates its case against positivism, and thereby excuses itself too readily from the obligation to substantiate its claims empirically. Political scientist Colin Hay, for instance, has argued that analysis must begin at a level of 'ontological depth', 'depending upon the concept of real strata apart from our knowledge of strata'. Indeed, he says, 'we must decide what exists out there to know about (ontology) before we might go about acquiring knowledge of it (epistemology)', a 'decision' that is apparently unconstrained.²⁸ The idea that to deal with ontology is to migrate from the realm of the empirical to a realm beyond our knowledge is one that I would join with the positivists in dismissing as metaphysical.

It does not follow, however, that one should have no truck with philosophy in dealing with ontological questions. Quite the contrary: the whole question of the ontology of political culture is raised, as the first section showed, by the failure of existing work in political science to address it. Positivism's operationalism, on the one hand, and interpretivism's hostility to theory, on the other, oblige us to seek out resources beyond the discipline of political science for the necessary closer look. I will deploy both philosophical and social-psychological resources to develop a dualistic ontology of culture, and thence political culture, which makes a fundamental distinction between two dimensions of culture, the practical and the discursive. The distinction has theoretical grounds in the philosophical arguments of Wittgenstein (as I interpret them) and Polanyi, and these have impressive parallels in some recent findings of experimental psychology.

The dualistic ontology in turn gives clear pointers to an understanding of the causal dynamics, and in particular the more or less openly admitted duality of the inertial and the fluid properties, of political culture. As I have suggested, this duality has never been properly explained, and even those who seek to address it explicitly have stopped at exemplifying it, producing only an empirical juxtaposition. We need from a theory of political culture an explanation of *why*, and not just an acknowledgement *that*, political culture can change as well as impede change, and what rates or kinds of change can be expected. Such an explanation is what I will derive from the dualistic ontology of political culture.

In developing this theory I will of course be depending considerably on the arguments of others. Even so, I will be taking an unorthodox course as far as the disciplinary expectations of political science are concerned. My view, putting it bluntly, is that disciplinary and sub-disciplinary boundaries have become a major impediment to theoretical work.

Within political science itself, the place of 'theory' is complicated by the emergence and consolidation of a division between 'positive' theory (the operationalization of concepts and the formulation of testable hypotheses) and 'normative' theory, a branch of moral philosophy which reasons about the proper, right, or good organization of political life—often simply called 'political theory'.²⁹ As a consequence, political science lacks a body of theory that would play the same role that 'social theory' does for sociology, a role that marks the recognition by many sociologists that in addition to empirical investigation there is need and scope for thinking about general processes, structures, connections, and concepts that may be suggested by the overall pattern of empirical research, or that may help to construct an agenda for future empirical research. Space for a theory of politics in this sense, of which the theory of political culture would be a component, has effectively been evacuated by the institutionalized intra-disciplinary division of labour.

Further impediments to theory are presented by the division of labour represented by disciplines themselves. Political culture research originated at a moment of high ambition about the prospects of a trans-disciplinary 'behavioural science'. The failure of this positivist programme brought about a withdrawal from such ambitions, and even though lip-service is still paid to the ideal of interdisciplinary work, incentives to remain within the confines of a single discipline are strong. Fearful of 'reduction', disciplines have erected artificial barriers around their fields of study, only rational choice theory seeming to constitute a live trans-disciplinary agenda. But rational choice theory represents only an extreme version of positivism, with statistical modelling replaced by deductive modelling based on explicitly unrealistic axioms, and thus again falls short of the substantive theory political science is lacking.

Above all, it is the ever-intensifying specialization of the social sciences that impedes adequate theorization, even as it encourages the proliferation of research programmes each with its justificatory theoretical paradigm. I am acutely aware that the several arguments I will make and consider in the following chapters could each in themselves be the subject not only of a book but nowadays of an entire academic career. Against this background, an attempt at comprehensive discussion and at reopening closed disciplinary boundaries courts accusations of diletantism, and at best abjures the comforts of membership in a tightly focused research network. But perhaps quixotically, I continue to believe that useful progress can be made in the spaces between

these ever more numerous (and sometimes unconsciously similar) intellectual strongholds.

The remainder of this book has eight chapters, followed by a Conclusion, which, as their titles will suggest, constitute four complementary pairs. In turn these add up to two halves of four chapters each, the first half setting out the necessity and possibility of a theory of political culture, and the second developing its substance. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the book.

The first pair of chapters will discuss the principal alternatives in political culture research, the positivist mainstream and its interpretive opposition. I have already provided an introductory sketch of the ways in which positivist and interpretive political culture research fall short of adequate theory, respectively by the *marginalization* and the *denial* of theory. Of course, the argument needs to be substantiated by more than a single case, and developed at greater depth. Chapter 1, on the positivist mainstream, will consider positivism as a philosophical position, noting also the realist critique, but concluding that it is not positivism per se that impedes theory in political culture research, but its implementation as a means of disciplinary consolidation, in a strategy I will call *disciplinary positivism*. The chapter will go on to examine the origins of political culture research and the effect of disciplinary consolidation on its development. It will argue that the main impediment to theoretical improvement has however been the operationalization of the concept of political culture in the attitude survey.

Chapter 2 turns to the interpretive alternative. It identifies interpretivism as a series of reactions to the progress of naturalistic social science, beginning with Herder and reaching a peak of philosophical ambition and sophistication with the work of Dilthey and Weber. Thereafter the intellectual centre of




Figure 1. Structure of the book.

gravity of interpretive social science shifted to anthropology, and the chapter continues with an examination of the cultural anthropology of Ruth Benedict, Marshall Sahlins, and Clifford Geertz, investigating in particular the trajectory that led Geertz to the radical anti-theoreticism whose echo we have already heard in the work of Chabal and Daloz. The limitations of the resulting position will be demonstrated.

The next two chapters turn from alternatives *in* political culture research to putative alternatives *to* it. My argument will be that just as political culture theory recurs covertly in the interpretive denial of it, more broadly the denial of an explanatory role for political culture by various alternative positions ultimately reveals a need to address it. Hence the attempted displacement of political culture only succeeds in removing it from the centre of attention, with the outcome that it cannot be adequately theorized within the resulting framework. Chapter 3 considers 'materialist' theoretical displacements, rational choice theory and Marxism. It shows how and with what results they covertly depend on a concept of political culture, and investigates how adequately they account for it when the dependence becomes overt, as it does most substantially in cultural Marxism. Chapter 4 deals with a set of critiques stemming from the work of Michel Foucault which I label 'discursivist'. These have the peculiarity that they displace the interpretive study of culture in particular, ironically applying to interpretivism the very critique interpretivism applies to positivist political culture research: that it is a covert expression of power. But while it poses as pure critique, discursivism too relies on a causal theory, which I will show it cannot adequately develop.

I turn in the second half of the book to the development of a new theory of culture and thus of political culture. What a theory of political culture should do, I have already suggested, is explain its ontology and its causal dynamics. These topics are the respective themes of the next two pairs of chapters. Chapter 5 returns to the relationship of positivist and interpretive political culture research, now however with a view to exploring what they have in common, and what further alternatives their endless dispute obscures. It turns to philosophy for alternative perspectives, but particularly to two philosophers who dissented radically from the Western philosophical tradition, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Polanyi. Interpretation of Wittgenstein is itself a large and vexed field, but Chapter 5 strikes a middle course between two polarized readings and derives from his writings on the philosophy of language a dualistic perspective on culture that distinguishes and separates practice and discourse. Polanyi's philosophy of science has emerged in recent years from a period of relative neglect, and provides, in the interpretation I will offer, a more concrete treatment of some of the themes brought to light by Wittgenstein, a treatment which focuses attention on the phenomenon of skilled practice.

Chapter 6 then consolidates the developing dualistic ontology of culture by addressing recent developments in social psychology and the theory of attitudes, the relevance of which is established by the positivist operationalization of political culture in the attitude survey. It investigates laboratory experiments that explore the relationship between attitudes and behaviour, a relationship taken for granted by political culture research. Striking parallels are discovered with the dissenting philosophical arguments considered in Chapter 5.

In the final pair of chapters I address political culture specifically, turning from its ontology (which is already established by the arguments of Chapters 5 and 6) to its dynamics. I argue that the dual dynamics, that is, the inertia and the fluidity of political culture, which have often been juxtaposed in political culture research but never given theoretical substantiation, can be understood in terms of the dualistic theory of culture. In Chapter 7 I discuss the inertial properties of political culture in terms of the theory of practice, focusing on the analytical paradigm of *skill*. In chapter 8 I turn to the fluid dynamics of political culture, and invoke, as a way of understanding the dynamics of discourse, the analytical paradigm of the *market*. In both cases I attempt to link the argument back into existing political culture research, showing how the theory I have developed offers support for some existing lines of enquiry as well as explanation of their limitations.

Theoretical Marginalization: The Positivist Mainstream of Political Culture Research

1.1. INTRODUCTION

I assume for the purpose of this chapter that it is not difficult to identify a 'mainstream' of political culture research; since my purpose is by no means to exclude from consideration what falls outside the mainstream (which I will address in later chapters), the designation may perhaps be allowed as roughly descriptive of work following in the footsteps of the early classic studies, with an overtly explanatory purpose and for the most part relying on attitude surveys as the means of measuring political culture. Since, on the other hand, the designation 'positivist' will do some of the argumentative work of this chapter, it should not be accepted so readily, even though it is, in fact, a label that is quite freely bandied about, perhaps more freely by those who would criticize it.

My main claim is that positivist political culture research, while it, like all research, does possess a theoretical framework, has marginalized theory in favour of operationalization and data collection. This marginalization is in part the consequence of the philosophical resources yielded by positivism. But it is more specifically the consequence of the way in which these resources have been deployed for the purpose of consolidation of the political science discipline. This second component of the explanation of the marginal status of theory in mainstream political culture research is important, since it allows some of the aims of positivist social science to be retained and deployed later for productive purposes in refurbishing the theory of political culture. Thus while this chapter amounts to a critique of positivist political culture research, it differs from several familiar ways in which positivism has been rejected, such as the hermeneutic or interpretive rejection, by being somewhat more discriminating.

The theoretical deficiencies of the mainstream of political culture research are explained, I will therefore argue, by a combination of the implications of positivism, the topic of section 1.2, with the imperatives faced by the discipline

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